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The Southern Palestine Offensive employing manoeuvre warfare, began on 31 October 1917, with the Battle of Beersheba, during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign, of World War I. After the capture of Beersheba, by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), the Gaza to Beersheba line became increasingly weakened and seven days later, the EEF successfully forced the Ottoman Turkish Empire's Seventh and Eighth Armies to withdraw. During the following seven days of pursuit, the Turkish forces were pushed back to Jaffa. There followed three weeks of hard fighting in the Judean Hills before Jerusalem was captured on 9 December 1917. During five and a half weeks of almost continuous offensive operations, the EEF captured of territory. After a joint attack by the XX and the Desert Mounted Corps, Beersheba at the eastern end of the Gaza to Beersheba line, was captured. The next day, on 1 November the Battle of Tel el Khuweilfe began, with an advance north of Beersheba into the Judean foorhills, by the 53rd (Welsh) and the ANZAC Mounted Divisions. This move up the road from Beersheba to Jerusalem, also threatened Hebron and Bethlehem. Then during the night of 1/2 November, the Third Battle of Gaza took place on the Mediterranean coast, when limited attacks by the XXI Corps, were made against strongly held, formidable defences. The next day, the fiercely contested fighting south of Tel el Khuweilfe by the EEF was not designed capture Hebron, but to create sufficient area for the deployment of the XX Corps, for a flank attack on the central defences of the old Gaza to Beersheba line. Fighting for the Beersheba to Jerusalem road, also encouraged the Turkish commanders to deploy their reserves, to hold the EEF threat. On 6 November the Battle of Hareira and Sheria was launched on the centre of the old line, half way between Gaza and Beersheba and Hareira captured, but it was not until late the next day, that the Sheria position was finally captured by the 60th (London) Division, after a failed Charge at Sheria by the 4th Light Horse Brigade (Australian Mounted Division). The Seventh and the Eighth Armies were by now in full retreat from the remains of the old Gaza to Beersheba line. On 7 November, the second day of the battle for Hareira and Sheria, the 52nd (Lowland) Division and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade advanced unopposed, through Gaza to attack strong rearguard positions, which would be captured the next day at the Capture of the Wadi Hesi. == Background == After the first two battles for Gaza, it was obvious to British commanders that large reinforcements were needed "to set General Murray's army in motion again."〔Wavell 1968 p. 89〕 Indeed, Murray made it clear to the War Cabinet and the Imperial General Staff early in May, that he could not invade Palestine without reinforcements.〔Keogh 1955 p. 122〕 The War Office assured him in the same month, that he should prepare to receive reinforcements, which would bring the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) up to six infantry and three mounted divisions.〔Falls 1930 Vol. 1 p. 360〕 However by July, when General Edmund Allenby took command of the EEF, 5,150 infantry and 400 yeomanry reinforcements were still needed after the casualties suffered during the battles for Gaza.〔Allenby to Robertson 12 July 1917 in Hughes 2004 pp. 34–5〕 By the end of the 1917 summer in the northern hemisphere, the political and the strategic interests of the British government and the EEF coincided. This was due in part to the failure on the Western Front of the French Republic's Nivelle offensive and the success of the German submarine campaign against British Empire shipping.〔Downes 1938 p. 660〕 The destruction of British shipping caused severe shortages in Britain, and although the United States of America had entered the war, their military support would not be apparent for some time. Britain was about to enter a fourth year of extremely costly war, and their Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, appreciated the need to take into account the "Home Front." He believed a striking military success could bolster the morale of the civil population, and he told Allenby that "he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation." Lloyd Gorge made clear that this victory was needed in order "to strengthen the staying power and morale" of Britain.〔Wavell 1968 p. 96〕 The British War Cabinet needed a successful Palestine offensive at a time when there was not much good news coming out of the Western Front, and when it was beginning to look like the war could extend into 1919. If they could capture Jerusalem this would put pressure on the Ottoman Empire, which could in turn place a strain on the German alliance, at the same time enhancing Britain's long term aim of strengthening their influence in the Middle East. By the end of October, the EEF was ready to attack.〔〔Bruce 2002 p. 116〕 The decision to launch a major offensive in Palestine, in the autumn of 1917, was also based on "very sound strategical reasons." The collapse of the Russian Empire in the spring led to the withdrawal of Russia from the war, as a consequence of the Russian Revolution, and freed up large numbers of Ottoman Empire troops, which had been fighting the Russians on the Eastern Front. These Ottoman units became available to reinforce the Palestine front and were in the process of assembling near Aleppo, along with German soldiers and equipment. They were to launch operations to recapture Baghdad, which had been captured by the British in March. The threat to Baghdad could be more economically opposed by an EEF offensive in southern Palestine. Rather than sending reinforcements to General Frederick S. Maude's Mesopotamian army holding Baghdad, British reinforcements from the Salonika front, which the War Office wanted to scale down, would strengthen the EEF.〔Wavell 1968 pp. 96–7〕 Allenby's strategical objective was a defeat of the Ottoman army in Southern Palestine, decisive enough to ensure Ottoman reinforcements destined for Baghdad were diverted to Palestine.〔 However, by 5 October, General William Robertson, CIGS, telegraphed Allenby that the War Cabinet desired him to eliminate the Ottoman Empire out of the war by a "heavy defeat", followed by the occupation of the Jaffa–Jerusalem line. He was to be supplied with "fresh British divisions ... at the rate of one every sixteen days." It was not until after the launching of the offensive that Allenby was told such increases to his force were improbable.〔Falls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 27〕 Allenby estimated the Ottoman Army could have 20 divisions, with no more than 12 on the front line. However, as these could be replaced by the Ottoman Army, the EEF could not field more than 14 divisions after the doubling of the railway line from Kantara, because of the limitations of the EEF's supply lines.〔 Between April and October 1917, both the EEF and the Ottoman Army laid railways and water pipe lines, and sent troops, guns and huge quantities of ammunition to the front.〔Cutlack 1941 p. 64〕 By mid-October 1917, a staff appreciation from London acknowledged the strength of the Ottoman defenders in Southern Palestine, and that any attempt to dislodge them from the Gaza to Beersheba line could cost three divisions. The appreciation acknowledged that "()he Turk is a stubborn fighter in trenches and we must expect that in any event he will stand long enough to cause us serious loss ... we must be prepared to supply General Allenby with three more divisions" to relieve weakened divisions.〔Erickson 2007 p. 124〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Southern Palestine Offensive」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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